Damascus and Doha, the surprisingly close siblings

Qatari and Syrian relations are probably stronger than any other connection in the Middle East. What makes them so, especially considering the differing relations they both have with the US and Israel? 
From an outside perspective, it seems fair to say that Syrian-Qatari relations suit both sides to a tee, and that these relations could be a standard example for what the terms between Arab states should be. The format of this close alliance stays in doubt, however, and doesn’t really function generally for all Arabs, as this relationship is based on the conflicting interests of the Arab states in general.

It was not surprising that Qatar was the first country in the Gulf that marketed the dialogue between Iran’s Ahmadinejad and the Arab Gulf States. Of course the step of inviting Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the Gulf Arab summit in six months ago, did need the approval from its other sister states, especially Saudi Arabia, but still the step could only have come from the Qataris, with their willingness to play the debatable middle man role, which one high-ranking Saudi diplomat described sarcastically to me as “unique.”
Unique it is; for Qatar has the biggest American military base in the Gulf, and hosts the only active Israeli liaison bureau in the area, despite the Arabs deciding to freeze any sort of cooperation with the Hebrew state after the last Palestinian uprising eight years ago. Qatar also stands in support of Hezbollah in their war against Israel, defending its political role in Lebanon, hosts Hamas leaders regularly, and finances the most influential media machine in the Arab world, Al-Jazeera, in its populist Islamic approach.
Why does Qatar play this complex role, and what can explain the “contradictions” of Qatari policy?
A friend, who once had the chance to ask Qatari leading officials this question, got a simple answer, which refers to what happened to militarily modest Kuwait in the second Gulf war when powerful Saddam Hussein took over the country in a day; the prospect of the Gulf states getting stronger than their power-hungry neighbors was grim. Qatar, as well as other Gulf states, preferred to be part of the equation by hosting the army of one of the main players in the Iraqi conflict, and be honest regarding their loyalty to America by opening up to Israel. This didn’t only promise Qatar stability in the long term, but also brought them into the political playground. Qatar was therefore able to compete to an extent with the Saudis, and bet on its losses. Al-Jazeera with its huge media success was one of the elements leading to Qatar gaining strength after strength.
This is probably where Syria comes in with its close ties with Doha.

Qatari officials are known to visit Damascus the most between all Arab and international officials. Prince Hamad bin al-Khalifa al-Thani is known to have a close personal relation with the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and it’s heard that Prince Hamad is building his own palace in the mountains of Yafur that overlook Damascus. Doha’s well known ALDIAR state development company has signed investment deals with the Syrian government that exceed $1 billion, and what’s more important was the Qatari role in promoting the Arab summit held in Damascus in March this year; Qatar built 26 presidential and royal villas in six month to accommodate the Arab statesmen, and helped with logistics as well as the non-stop political support. 
For Syria, Qatar has gone above and beyond to prove to be a loyal friend. Usually when Syrian officials are asked out of curiosity about their relationship with Doha, despite the latter’s closeness to America and Israel, the response generally is admiration for their frankness and openness, as well as the transparency of their actions. That answer normally triggers a discussion about the other Arab states that Syria has been struggling to build tactical and strategic alliances with. The stand the Saudis and Egyptians took on the Arab summit, the way Jordan followed, and the retreat by the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh by not attending, added extra value to the support the Qatari have showed to Syria.
One other simple but important element that strengthens the relationship is how Syria is portrayed by Qatari Media. Al-Jazeera’s support for the opposition in Lebanon, its stand on the Palestinian question, and its strong Arabism and Islamic policy, touches the heart of Syrians, who have been obsessed lately with the media’s role in portraying the events and opinions affecting them, especially after the assassination of former Lebanese head of cabinet Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. Further, Al-Jazeera opened its first training center outside Doha in Damascus, and has a very careful policy when it comes to Syrian affairs.
The relationship is still somewhat tentative. Many believe that the competitive spirit between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is the main pillar in this smooth Syrian Qatari alliance. Others believe that the ambitious leaders of Qatar have chosen their role in this overall conflict, which splits the Arabic world and the region between two approaches, a sectarian one and a national one, Qatar following the latter approach.
That gives another reason for Doha politicians to initiate on the Lebanese crisis, and broker a deal between Lebanese rivals in mid-May 2008. Why not?  Qatar has no direct interests in Lebanon, other than perhaps agitating the Saudis. It is a Liberal Sunni Emirate with the closest Arab relations with Syria and Iran, and is the only Gulf state that has a church (opened last March in Doha).
Its seeming neutrality gives Qatar an advantage in these talks. However, difficulties stand with Lebanon and the region far deeper than the dialogue halls in Sheraton Doha, and the unique reputation Qatar has succeeded in building through the years, might not be enough to stabilize Lebanon and the region. Certain elements in the Middle East can only clash, no matter how hospitable and pragmatic the Qataris are.